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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: THE RIGHT TO RESiST AN UNLAWFUL ARREST:

AN OuT-DATED CONCEPT?

The recent "civil rights" demonstrations have brought into sharp
focus some of the problems inherent in the law of arrest.
In Los Angeles, in August, 1965, resistance to what the arrestee contended was an unlawful arrest triggered a three-day riot which cost the
lives of 34 persons and loss of property estimated at 200 millions of

dollars.
In Rochester, New York, in 1964, rioting touched off by a purported
unlawful arrest ended after full police authority had been brought to bear.
The press has been filled with stories and photographs of persons,
after being arrested, being carried to waiting police vehicles. These persons
contend that the "crime" for which they had been arrested was unconstitutional, threfore, the arrest was unlawful.
The "civil rights" demonstrators are not alone in resistance to what
they believe is unlawful arrest. Misdemenants and felons alike have been
resisting arrest since early British history.'
The right to be free of an unlawful arrest has been inherent in our
Angol-American jurisprudence since the signing of the Magna Carta in
1215.2 Freedom from unlawful arrest is named in the Magna Carta; but
also, the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizurej is enumerated in both the United States Constitution 4 and the Oklahoma Constitution.
This right to be free of an unreasonable arrest implies that if an
arrest which is in fact unlawful is initiated, the person thus wronged has
some remedy. The problem lies in the determination of what remedy is
to be applied to this wrong, and more important (from our point of view)
when it is to be applied.
In order to consider the problem, one must determine what an
arrest is, when it is lawful, and conversely, when it is unlawful. In order
to consider the remedy applicable, study must be given to the time when
the arrest is determined to be unlawful, and who makes that determination.
1 Hopkin Huggett's Case, 1 Kelyng 59, 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B. 1666).

2 MAGNA CARTA, § 39.
3 Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Ar.

fest? 51 J. CalM. L, C. & P. S. 402 (1960). This article discusses "seizure" as it
has been construed by the courts to include arrest of persons.
4 U. S. CONST. amend. IV.

5 OKLA. CoNsr. art. 2, 5 30.
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L&wFuL AND UNLAWFUL

The word "arrest" comes from the Latin through the French word
"arreter" meaning to "stop," "stay" or "restrain;" the law requires an
actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, under a real or
pretended authority for the purpose of taking the individual into the
custody of the law.6

An arrest is "taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense."7 Arrest is
effected by an actual restraint of the arrestee's liberty,8 and the person
arrested must be conscious of the restraint.9
The duty or privilege to arrest is regulated by statute.'0 Under the
applicable Oklahoma law, an officer must arrest those persons whom he
has authority to arrest. He has no right not to arrest, and in fact, is guilty
of a felony, if he "commits any unlawful act tending to hinder justice.""
Oklahoma Statutes provide that arrests may be made in the following
ways, by an officer:
2
1. acting under the authority of an arrest warrant;'
2. without a warrant of arrest, "for a public offense committed or
attempted in his presence;"' 3
3. without a warrant, "when the person arrested has committed a
a felony, but not in the presence of the arresting officer;"' 4
4. without a warrant, "when a felony has been committed and the
officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;"'15
5. without a warrant, "on a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of
the commission of a felony by the party arrested;' 16
6. without a warrant, at night, when an officer has reasonable cause
to believe that a felony was committed by the person arrested,
even though it is later determined that no felony was committed.' 7
6 Wilgus, Arrest Without A Warrant,22 MIcH. L REV. 541 (1924).

7 A.L.I.

taries 289.

Code of Criminal Procedure § 18 (1931); 4 Blackstone Commen-

8 Alter v. Paul, 101 Ohio App. 139, 135 NE. 2d 73 (1955).
9 Jenkins v. U.S. 161 F.2d 99 (10th Cir. 1947); Harrer v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 124 Mont.295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950); State v. Williams, 237 S.C.
252, 116 S.E.2d 858 (1960).
10 Jones v. State, 88 Okla. Cr. 243, 202 P.2d 228 (1949); Duffey v. State,
79 Okla. Cr. 218, 153 P.2d 629 (1944); Marple v. State, 51 Okla. Cr. 240, 1
P.2d 836 (1931). Regarding a peace officer's duty to arrest, see 21 OKLA. STAT.
S 532 (1961); 37 Mo. Stat. § 544.140 (1949; State v. Nolan 354 Mo. 980, 192
S.W.2d 1016 (1946); State v. Boyd, 108 Mo. 518, 84 S.W. 191 (1904); Walter,
Some Proposals for Modernizing the Law of Arrest, 39 CALIF. L REv. 96, 103
(1951).
11 21 OKLA.STAT.§ 532(3) (1961).

12 22 OKLA.STAT.§ 187(1) (1961).
Is 22 OKLA.STAT.§ 196(1) (1961).
'4 22 OimA. STAT. § 196(2) (1961).
"16 22 OiKA.STAT.§ 196(3) (1961).
16 22 OKLA.STAT.§ 196(4) (1961).
:1722 OKLA.STAT.S 198 (1961).
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Arrests made under any circumstances other than those listed in the appropriate statute are unlawful.' 8
From these statutes it can be seen that the law, in Oklahoma, requires one of three things for an arrest by a peace officer to be lawful; he
is required to arrest under a proper warrant, or for an offense committed
or attempted in his presence, or upon reasonable belief that the persoa
arrested has committed a felony.
As a matter of law, a person has a right to resist any unlawful arrest.1
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in an early case said:
A peace officer making an arrest without authority to do
so occupies the same relations (sic) to the party arrested
that any other private citizen would. He is a trespasser who
has no right to detain the person, and hence no right to
prevent an2 0 escape, and in preventing an escape he is still a
trespasser.

The court also held that the Oklahoma statute pertaining to self
defense was applicable.21 The statute states that one may use whatever
force is necessary to repel a trespass,
provided that the force used does
22
not exceed that which is necessary.
A majority of the states recognize the right to resist an unlawful
arrest.23 In these states the law has created an anomaly. In Oklahoma, for
example, an officer is informed during the night, by a person whom he
considers to be reliable, that X has committed a felony, when in fact X
has committed no wrong. The officer has authority, under the statute, to
rrest X,24 and in fact, he is duty bound to effect the arrest. 25 But, X, who
has committed no wrong, is privileged to resist arrest. It is unlawful as to
him.26

The guilty person may also resist an unlawful arrest. Professor John
B. Waite, writing in the Michigan Law Review, commented:
18 Note that the statutes cited apply only to arrests by peace officers; the
statute setting out a private citizens right to arrest is 22 OKLA. STAT. 5 202

(1961).

'9 See, Yates v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 51, 117 P.2d 811 (1941); Davis v
State, 53 Okla. Cr. 411, 12 P.2d 555 (1932); Collegenia v. State, 9 Okla. Cr
425, 132 P. 375 (1913).
20 Collegenia v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 425, 132 P. 375 (1913).
21 Collegenia v. State, supra note 19.
22 21 OKLA. STAT. § 643(3) (1961). This section of the statute is identical
to the New York statute on self defense, N. Y. CONSOL. LAws § 246 (McKinney
1944), as applied in People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308, 121 N.E.2d 238 (1954).
23 See, State v. Eddington, 95 Ariz. 10, 386 P.2d 20 (1963); Finch v. State,
101 Ga. App. 73, 112 S.E.2d 824 (1960); People v. Smith, 315 Ill. App. 671, 43
N.E.2d 420 (1942); State v. Goering, 193 Kan. 307, 392 P.2d 930 (1964);
State v. Miller, 253 Minn. 112, 91 N.W.2d 138 (1958); State v. Parker, 378

S.W.2d 274 (Mo. 1964); Walters v. State, 403 P.2d 267 (Okla. Cr. App. 1965);

and King v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. 442, 99 S.W.2d 932 (1936).
24 22 OKLA. STAT. § 198 (1961).
25 21 OKLA.STAT. § 532(3) (1961).

28 Perrott v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956)
Dreares, 15 App. Div. 2d 204, 221 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1961).
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As a matter of common sense, the average man may feel
startled at the idea that a person guilty of felony [or misdemeanor] possesses a legal right to resist the police officer
who 7endeavors to arrest him; but such appears to be the
law?
In a Washington case, the court said, "Every man, however guilty,
has a right to shun an illegal arrest by flight."2 8
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The historical development of the right to resist an unlawful arrest
can be traced through the modern American cases2" to Bishop's New
Criminal Law, in which the author states, "If one, even an officer, undertakes to arrest another unlawfully, the latter may resist him."30 It is interesting to note that the author cites no authority for this statement.
The authors of Selected American Cases on the Law of Self Defence
(sic) 31 continue in much the same vein:
Although a man will not be justified, then, if he kill in defence (sic) against an illegal arrest of an ordinary character; yet, the law sets such a high value upon the liberty of
the citizen, that an attempt to arrest him unlawfully is esteemed a great provocation, such as will reduce3 2a killing in
the resistance of such an arrest to manslaughter
In support of this statement, several British and American cases are
cited. In Rex v. Patience,3 3 decided in 1837, the court held that the arrest
of the defendant was unlawful, therefore, he had a lawful right to resist.
In Rex v.Curvan,3 4 decided in 1826, the court held that there was no
right to arrest, and the resistance by the defendant was lawful. In Rex v.
3
Thompsonp
decided in 1825, an arrest was attempted, but because of
resistance by the defendant, failed. The court held the attempted arrest
was unlawful, therefore, the defendant had a right to resist. So holding,
the court cited Rex v. Ford,36 decided in 1817. (Here the authority used
in Selected American Cases on the Law of Self Defense (sic) 3 7 becomes

less substantial.) In Ford, the court ruled that the arrest was legal, but
27

Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons, 31 'MicH. L. 1Ev. 749,

754-55 (1933). (Emphasis by author.)
28 State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash. 2d 92, , 241 P.2d 447, 449 (1952). "
20 Roberson v. State, 43 Fla. 156, 29 So. 535 (1901) was cited by the Okla.

homa Court of Criminal Appeals in Walters v. State, 403 P.2d 267 (1965).
App. 1965).
30 1 BIsHOP, NEw CRIMNINAL LAW § 868 (2) (8th ed. 1892).

31 HORRIGAN & THOMPSON, SELECTED AMERICAN CASES ON THE
LAW OF SELF DEFENCE (sic) (1874).
32 Id. at 716.
33 Rex v. Patience, 7 Car. & P. 775, 173 Eng. Rep. 338 (N.P. 1837).
34 Rex v. Curvan, 1 Moody 132, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B. 1826).
35 Rex v. Thompson, 1 Moody 80, 168 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1825).
36 Rex v. Ford, Rus. & Ry. 329, 168 Eng. Rep. 828 (K.B. 1817).
37 Horrigan & Thompson, op. cit. supra note 31.
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commented, as dictum, that one has a lawful right to resist an unlawful
arrest.
In The Queen v. Tooley,38 decided in 1710, the court held that the
defendant had a right to resist an unlawful arrest, and therefore, his resistance would be excused. So ruling, the court mentioned Hopkin Haggett's Case,39 decided in 1666, but overruled it.
Hopkin Huggett's Case ruled that one could not resist an unlawful
arrest, nor could persons aid one unlawfully arrested. The court said:
And we thought it to be of dangerous consequence to give
any encouragement to private men to take upon themselves
to be the assertors of other men's liberties, and to become
patrons to rescue them from wrong; especially in a nation
where good laws are for the punishment of all such injuries,
and one great end of law is to right men by peaceable
means, and to discountenance all endeavors to right themselves, much less other men, by force.40
With this language, the court overruled the next case upon which
the authors of Selected American Cases on the Law of Self Defence (sic)
and the courts in subsequent cases have relied.
Sir Henry Ferrers's (sic) Case,41 decided in 1635, is unusual in that
it has apparently been misinterpreted by the authorities which cite it.
£Tlroubling to dip into the "history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence" can be quite a different thing from
42 merely assuming that it is what one might wish it to be.
Ferrers's (sic) Case involved an unlawful arrest. The facts were
these. A warrant had issued for the arrest of Sir Henry Ferrets, Knight.
His true name was Sir Henry Ferrets, Baronet. The warrant was executed;
Ferrers obeyed and was taken into custody. His servant attempted to rescue
him, and in so doing, killed the arresting constable. The court, in deciding the case, said:
But upon the evidence it appeared dearly, that Sir Henry
Ferrets obeyed, and was put into an (sic) house before the
fighting betwixt the officer and his servant; wherefore he
43
was found "not guilty" of the murder and manslaughter.
Obviously, the case was decided on the merits; Ferrets had been
charged with murder, the contention being that he was "present, aiding
and abetting & c."' 4 4 The evidence led the court to believe that he had been
removed from the scene of the fighting, that he had complied with the
arrest, although it was unlawful.
38 The Queen v. Tooley, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1710).
39 Hopkin Huggett's Case, supra note 1.
40 Id. at 1083.
41 Sir Henry Ferrers's (sic) Case, Cro. Car. 371, 79 Eng. Rep. 924 (KB.
1635 "Kuh, Reflections on New York's 'Stop and Frisk' Law and Its Claimed Unconstitutionality, 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 32, 33 (1965).
43 Sir Henry Ferrers's (sic) Case, supra note 41 at 372, 79 Eng. Rep. at 924.
44 Sir Henry Ferrets's (sic) Case, supra note 41 at 371, 79 Eng. Rep. 924.
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While the court in Ferrers's (sic) Case does talk of an unlawful
arrest, there was no issue involving the arrest, rather the murder of the
officer, and Ferrers' participation therein. Without question, the comments of the court about unlawful rrest, which have been followed by
subsequent courts almost religiously, are dicta.
From these cases, it appears that the law was in a state of flux between 1635 when Ferrers's (sic) Case was decided and 1710 when
Tooley's case was decided. It also appears that the law had solidified by
1825 when the Thompson case was decided. From 1825 to date, the law
in the United States has remained consistent with the principle enunciated
in Tooley's case.
The confusion as to how the law came to be what it is today should
by now be readily apparent to the most casual observer. The modern law
is ciear, regardless of the fact that it is based on dicta.
In the majority of the United States, the person sought to be arrested can resist that which he believes to be an unlawful arrest; an officer is bound, and under legal sanctions should he fail,4 5 to "act aggressively" 46 and carry through with an arrest once he commences it.
In history, there is disagreement with the present law. Some philosophers hold that the government of man should be supreme, unless the decrees of that government are contrary to basic moral concepts.
Saint Thomas Acquinas, in his Summa Theologica, said:
Now it happens often that the observance of some point of
law conduces to the common good in the majority of cases
and yet in some cases is very hurtful. Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the
law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention to the common good... .Nevertheless
it must be noted that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing
instant remedy, it is not the business of anyone whatsoever
to expound
what is useful and what is not useful to the
47
state.
From this, it can be seen that at least one philosopher does not agree with
the modern American law.
In addition, John Locke, the great advocate of individual liberty as
opposed to state intervention, said:
[Wlhere the injured party may be relieved and his damages repaired by appeal to the law, there can be no pretence for force, which is only to be used where a man is
intercepted from appealing to the law.48
dG 21 OKLA. STAT. § 532 (3) (1961).
46

Champion v. State, 253 Ala. 428,

-

, 44 So.2d 616, 620 (Ct. App.

1949).

47 Acquinas, Summa Theologica-PartI of Second Part Q. 96, Art. 6, in 20
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 235 (Hutchins ed. 1952).
48 Locke, Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, ch. 18 § 207, in 35 GREAT BOOKS or THE WESTERN WORLD 25, 72
(Hutchins ed. 1952).
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Locke maintained, however, that there must be some adequate remedy afforded the wronged party, and in a later section stated that if the
majority of the people are wronged, "how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against them I cannot tell. This is an inconvenience, I confess, that attends all governments .... 49
John Stuart Mill suggests the law in answer to Locke's query. "Whenever,... there is a definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either
to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out of the province of
liberty and placed in that of morality or law."50
THE MODERN VIEW
It could be argued that the views of these men have been passed by
the times. However, that they lived and wrote centuries ago does not fect the validity of their thoughts, their concepts, and the effect of the
ideas which they upheld. As recently as 1964, Judge J. Edward Lumbard,
speaking before the Chicago Crime Commission, agreed with Acquinas,
Locke and Mill. Judge Lumbard said:
Our effort must be on a national scale and, in order to bear
fruit, it must win the consensus of all citizens who believe
that orderly government is the indispensable basis for individual liberty and the reasonable enjoyment of our cherished freedoms.51
judge Lumbard, while speaking for himself, was but echoing the
opinions of others knowledgeble in the field, such as Professor John B.
Waite, of the University of Michigan Law School, and Professor Sam B.
Warner, of the Harvard Law School. Both of these men, according to 0.
W. Wilson, Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, "have accompanied the police on their tours of duty to learn and report the true
facts. 52 As a result of their experience, and as a solution to the anomaly
created by the present law, Professor Warner played the principle role in
drafting the Uniform Arrest Act.53
The right to resist an unlawful arrest is recognized in 45 of the 50
states. 54 Four of the states which forbid resistance to an unlawful arrest
operate under Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act. They are Rhode Is49

35

209, at 73.

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,op.

cit. supra note 48, 5

5o Mill, On Liberty, ch. 4, in 43 GREAT BooKs OF THE WESTERN WORLD
267, 306 (Hutchins ed. 1952).
51 Lumbard, The Citizen's Role in Law Enforcement, 57 J.CIuM. LC. &
P. S. 67, 72 (1965). This article is the text of an address delivered by Judge Lum.
bard on November 15, 1964, to the Chicago Crime Commission.
52

Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Mfodcrniza-

tion, 51 J.Clum.L., C. &P. S. 395, 399 (1960).
53 The UNIFORM ARREST ACT is set out in full in 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343

(1942). For the purpose of this comment, we are concerned only with section 5,

which provides in substance, that one may, not resist arrest by a peace officer.
54 For a sampling of various jurisdictions, see supra note 23.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1966

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 3 [1966], Iss. 1, Art. 4
NOTES AND COMMENTS

19661

land, New Hampshire, Delaware and California.s5 The Uniform Arrest
Act is an attempt, on the part of educated, informed persons to provide
a compromise between unbounded liberty and an ordered society. Section
5 of the act provides:
If a person has reasonable ground to believe that he is
being arrested by a peace officer, it is his duty to refrain
from using force or any weapon in resisting arrest regardless of whether or not there is a legal basis for the arrest.56
In a fifth state, New Jersey, a court of appeals recently ruled that
resistance to an unlawful arrest is unlawful "Self-help," said the court,
"is antisocial in an urbanized society."'' 7 Acting where the state legislature had not, the court said: "We declare it to be the law of this state
that a private citizen may not use force to resist arrest by one he knows
or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer, whether or
not the arrest is illegal"'5 s
REMEDIES
It is submitted that this section is the only solution of the anomaly
brought about by the confrontation of the duty-bound, reasonably careful
officer with the suspicious, though innocent, citizen in the arrest-resist
situation.
However, while the Uniform Arrest Act provides that a person who
has been arrested by a peace officer may not lawfully resist arrest, it does
not prohibit or preclude the traditional remedies afforded the victim of
an unlawful arrest. A person, unlawfully arrested, still has access to the
traditional tort remedies for false imprisonment or false arrest. In addition, the criminal sanctions of false arrest, false imprisonment, or in extreme cases, kidnapping are present to deter the mistaken or overzealous
officer. However, it is recognized that, "Civil suits for damages filed
against the individual officer have not proved adequately effective in preventing police abuse of authority."59
Nor have criminal sanctions against police officers been particularly
successful, as is noted by Caleb Foote in the Minnesota Law Review. Professor Foote observed: 'rhere are criminal penalties in existence providing for the punishment of many types of police violations of individual
rights, but these are ineffective for the obvious reason that policemen and
prosecutors do not punish themselves."60
5 R. 1. GEN. LAws ANN. S 12-7-10 (1956); N. H. Ruv. STAT. ANN. 594:5
(1955); DEL. CODE ANN. TiT. 11, S 1905 (1953); CAL. PENAL CODE § 835
(a) (Supp. 1965).
56
57

UNiFORm ARREST AcT 5 5.
TfE, Nov. 12, 1965, p. 61.

Gs Ibid.
59 Wilson, supra note 52, at 400.
00 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L REv. 493 (1955). See also, LAFAVE, ARREsT-THE DECISION TO TAM A
SUSPEcr INTO CusToDY 426 (1965).
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It would be, under these circumstances, foolish to advocate the Uniform Arrest Act. One basic premise of our form of government and of
our system of law is that there be an adequate remedy for every wrong.
The Uniform Arrest Act removes the right to resist an unlawful arrest; it
provides no remedy in the event an unlawful arrest is effected.
1
The Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Rousseau, suggests:
If further protections are desirable against unlawful arrest,
search and seizure, they can and should be provided legislatively rather than through a somewhat emotional shotgun
application of a rule of evidence which misses the bull'seye, the specific aim or purpose of the rule-that is the protection of the innocent, law-abiding citizen-about as often
as it hits it. Legislation, on the other hand, could be pinpointed and directed precisely at specific protection for innocent persons who are victimized by law enforcement officers. Among other things, (a) criminal penalties, and (b)
the amount of civil damages recoverable could be increased
significantly. The legislature in a variety of ways could facilitate recovery of civil damages and provide any needed
unlawful aradditional protection for
62 innocent victims of
rest, search and seizure.
Much the same was advocated by Chicago's Superintendent of Police, 0. W. Wilson, in his article "Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Modernization."63 Wilson cites approvingly a study by
the California Bar Association Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, which proposed:
Tlhe answer [to the problem of unlawful arrest, search
and seizure] might lie in a new kind of civil action, or better, a summary type of proceeding, for a substantial judgment in favor of the wronged individual, whether innocent
or guilty, and against the political subdivision whose enforcement officers violated that person's rights. After not
many outlays of public funds the taxpayers and administrative 64
heads would insist upon curbing unlawful police action.
CONCLUSIONS
We submit that the legal right to resist an unlawful arrest is an
outdated concept; it is founded on considerations perhaps valid centuries
ago, but which should have no effect on the modern law of arrest.
When the law of arrest developed, resistance to an arrest by
a peace officer did not involve the serious dangers it does
61 State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash. 2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952).
62 Id. at -, 241 P.2d at 452 (Concurring opinion).
63 Wilson, supra note 52, at 400-01.
64 Ibi, quoting 29 CAL S. B. J. 263-64 (1954).
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today. Constables and watchmen were armed only with
staves and swords, and the person to be apprehended might
successfully hold them off with his own weapon and thus
escape. Today, every peace officer is armed with a pistol
and has orders not to desist from making an arrest though
there is forceful resistance. Accordingly, successful resistance is usually possible only by shooting the officer to prevent him from shooting first. 5

What has been created is an extremely dangerous and undesirable
anomaly which progressive legislation, as urged by the Washington
court" and the California Bar,67 can correct.
Judge Lumbard, addressing the Chicago Crime Commission, urged
legislative reformation of our criminal laws, saying: "[W]e must comstates there has been
pletely overhaul criminal justice. In many of our
6' 8
no thorough re-examination for almost 100 years."
What is acknowledged by every authority in the field is the desirability of maximum public security with minimum interference with public liberty. The law has the duty to mediate these opposites within the
framework of American liberties. "[I]n view of the considerations inremedied by the proper mavolved, is it not better, that illegal arrest be
chinery of the law rather than by the pistol?69
Fully realizing that imposition by the law of Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act will lower the minimum allowable interference with individual liberties, it is nonetheless urged as the necessary compromise to
protect both the individual and the officer from injury or even death.
Any compromise, however, requires some mutual concession. Individuals, wronged by mistaken or overzealous peace officers, should have
effective sanctions provided by law, rather than the present inadequate
remedies.
In short, Section 5 of the Uniform Arrest Act should be enacted to
end the presently existing anomaly: the right to resist an unlawful arrest
versus the duty to arrest and overcome resistance. To temper the use of
this near-absolute freedom to arrest, based on reasonable belief, legislation should be enacted, concurrent with this section of the Uniform Arrest
Act, allowing the wronged individual to bring an action in tort against
both the arresting officer and the political subdivision by which he is
employed.
Max Hochanadel
Harry V. Stege
65 Warner, The Uniforma Arrest Act, 28 VA. L REV. 315, 330 (1942).

66 State v. Rousseau, supranote 62.

67 Wilson, supra note 52, at 400-01.
698Lumbard, suranote 51, at 67.

09 Note, 23 MlcH. L. REv. 62, 66 (1924).
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